In a recently published paper, Edmans, García, and Norli (2007) reveal a strong association between results of soccer games and local stock returns. Inspired by their work, we propose a novel approach to exploit this effect on the aggregate international level with the following three unique features: (i) The aggregate effect does not depend on the games results; hence, the effect is an exploitable predictable effect. (ii) The aggregate effect is based on many games; hence, it is very large and highly significant. We find that the average return on the U.S. market over the World Cup's effect period is -2.58%, compared to +1.21% for alldays average returns over the same period length. (iii) Exploiting the aggregate effect is involved with trading in a single index for a relatively long period. JEL Classification Codes: A12, A14, F21, G14
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I. Introduction
Numerous studies document an association between stock returns and investor sentiment.
1 In a recent study, Edmans, García, and Norli (EGN) (2007) reveal a strong association between results of soccer games and local stock returns. 2 They investigate 39 stock markets and find an asymmetric effect, where losses have a significant negative effect in the losing countries' local markets, whereas victories do not have a significant effect. 3 Generally speaking, one cannot economically exploit the local effect because, once the game result is known, it is too late to sell stocks of the losing country, as prices are already lower. In principle, one can profit by holding short positions on the stocks of both countries: one will make a profit in the losing country and will neither lose nor gain abnormal profits in the winning country. However, as EGN (2007) note, the profits from this strategy are probably insufficient to cover the transaction costs involved in investing in two markets for a single day.
In this study, we develop a practical method to exploit the asymmetric characteristic of the soccer sentiment effect. This method is not only highly profitable 1 See, for example, Saunders (1993) , Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) , Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000 , Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004) , Loughran and Schultz (2004) , and Cao and Wei (2005) . For a comprehensive survey of the literature on behavioral biases and their influence on the stock market, see Shiller (2000) , Hirshleifer (2001) and Shefrin (2002) . 2 In the U.K. market, Ashton, Gerrard, and Hudson (2003) reveal a strong association between the performance of England's soccer team and subsequent daily changes in the FTSE 100 Index.
3 EGN (2007) provide three explanations for this asymmetry: (i) Many studies show a significant difference in the behavior of fans following wins and losses, where the impact in the latter case is much stronger.
(ii) If we assume that the reference point of soccer fans is that their team will win (which is usually the case due to fans' "allegiance bias") then, according to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, the impact of a loss would be much stronger than the impact of a win. (iii) There are completely different repercussions to a win than to a loss in the World Cup; a loss means that the team is no longer in the competition, whereas a win merely advances the team to the next step.
on average, even when transaction costs are incorporated, but also dominates the buyand-hold strategy by the mean-variance criterion. We propose a different approach to exploit the soccer sentiment effect which is based on the aggregate effect that spills over from the numerous local markets to the U.S. market. The main hypothesis is that during the World Cup period there is a global negative effect induced by all losing countries' fans at an international level. This hypothesis is based on the relatively large proportion of investors in any given country, who invest internationally, mainly in the U.S. market. For example, in 2006 the transactions conducted by foreign investors in the U.S. stock market (equity only) constituted 33% of all transactions.
Thus, if there is a negative market sentiment effect driven by the losing country's investors, the change in the investment proportions in risky and riskless assets is not confined to the local stock market: we also expect a negative effect in the U.S.
market. Besides the local effect in each losing country's market, we predict that the aggregate effect of all games in a round, which is negative due to the asymmetry found by EGN (2007) , will spill over to the U.S. market. In addition to the asymmetry claim, with each round of the World Cup the number of losing countries increases, until eventually there is only one winning country and dozens of losing countries. As the number of losing countries increases, we expect the aggregate effect on the U.S. stock market to be even larger than the local market effect. This is because, although each game may have a lower impact on the U.S. market than on the local market, the U.S. market is affected by many more games.
Our proposed approach to exploit the effect offers three major features: First, on the theoretical grounds, our approach does not depend on the game results, as the investment strategy is employed on the U.S. market and not on the losing country local market. Hence at each round, the aggregate effect is the net sum of all losing countries' negative effects. As the aggregate effect does not depend on the game results it is an exploitable predictable effect.
Second, as the effect is based on about 30 losing countries and numerous games it is large, highly significant, and long lasting. The average return on the U.S. market over the World Cup's global effect days is % 58 . 2 − , compared to % 21 . 1 + for all-days average returns over the same period length. 4 Finally, on technical grounds, the proposed strategy to exploit the effect is employed on a single index, in the most liquid market in the world and for the relatively long period of a month. Thus, the associated transaction costs are small relative to the abnormal profits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents some background for the event variable and the theoretical justification for the selection of the U.S. market. Section III presents the methodology used to investigate the significance of the effect. Section IV provides the regression results and robustness checks. Section V presents a trading strategy aiming to exploit the effect, and the resulting abnormal profits. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Motivation, Theoretical Background, and Handling Spurious Correlations
In this section, first, we briefly explain why the World Cup games may affect investor sentiment. Second, we explain why the U.S. market is expected to be affected by this sentiment despite the fact that soccer is not very popular in the U.S. Third, we review the sources of possible spurious correlations that may distort our results and explain the way we handle these problems. 
A. Soccer Games, the World Cup and Mood
B. The World Cup Soccer Games and the U.S. Market
As soccer is not very popular in the U.S., selecting this market to exploit EGN's local effect appears unnatural at a first glance. However, looking at international investments in the U.S., we find that the U.S. market is the most appealing market to exploit the effect for the following reasons. First, it is probably unaffected by unknown results of the U.S. team, as soccer is not very popular in the U.S. Second it is a very liquid market with relatively low transaction costs. Third and most important, many foreign investors invest in the U.S. market. Thus, if soccer games are involved with negative sentiment effect, there is no reason why this effect should be confined to the local market.
To give a sense of the magnitude of international investments in general, and the investments in the U.S. equity market in particular, 
C. Exploitable Effect or Spurious Correlations?
In this study we document significant negative rates of return in the U.S.
during the World Cup. Although the findings of EGN (2007) regarding the negative effect in the local markets are well established, our hypothesis that the local effect spills over to the U.S. market through foreign trading is yet to be tested. Thus, there is the possibility that our results are spurious. Below, we identify several factors that may induce spurious correlation and then explain the empirical methods we employ to verify that they are not spurious. 3. Another possibility is that some events that affect the U.S. market, e.g., a war, have occurred during the World Cup; hence, the association found is spurious. We handle this issue in two ways. First, we search for all major events with effects on the U.S. stock market that occurred during the 58-year period studied, and if they occurred close to the time of the World Cup the year is eliminated from the regression. Indeed, we run the regression also without 1950, as in this year the World Cup and the beginning of the Korean War overlapped. In addition, we run the regressions with a dummy variable for extreme days in the stock market (including the day the Korean War began), aiming to capture extreme events unrelated to the World Cup.
4. The World Cup always takes place in June and July. 9 Thus, one may suspect that the results are due to a seasonal effect occurring in June and July rather than due to 9 In very few occasions, it includes also the last day of May or the first days of August.
the World Cup. We handle this possibility in two ways. First, in the general tests we add a June-July annual dummy variable aiming to capture any annual seasonal effect during this period of the year. Secondly, we also run the regressions when the data are composed of June and July days only of the 58-year period (recall that the World Cup falls during the June-July period once every four years). Thus, we compare the returns on June-July during the World Cup to the returns on JuneJuly in years without the World Cup.
III. Methodology
Our null hypothesis is that the U.S. market is efficient and no exploitable abnormal profits exist. The alternative hypothesis is that the event coefficient is statistically significant. To test the null hypothesis, we first adopt the same methodology used in previous event studies (e.g., Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003) and EGN (2007) ; for more on event study methodologies, see Brown and Warner (1985) ) and run the following regression:
(1)
where R t is the daily return, 0 γ is the regression intercept coefficient, R t-1 and R t-2 are the first and second previous day returns, respectively, D it , i = 1..4, are dummy variables for the day of the week: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively, 10 H t is a dummy variable for days after a non-weekend holiday (see Kim and Park (1994) ), T t is a dummy variable for the first five days of the taxation year (see Dyl and Maberly (1992) ), P t is a dummy variable for the annual event period
(June-July), E t stands for the event days, and J it , i = 1,2, are dummy variables for the 2. Event Period Effect Days (EPED) are defined as all days of the World Cup, from the first game to the first day after the final game (i.e., including the break before the final game), plus two additional trading days. Thus, the EPED are composed of all EED plus one or two break days plus two trading days after the EED. This definition allows us to implement a simple and practical trading strategy aiming to exploit the effect, as is elaborated in the coming sections. As will be shown below, the two definitions yield similar results, and the effect is generally robust to the selected period as long as it is close to the event itself. model (see Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) 
IV. The Empirical Results
In this section we present the main regression results related to mean return of World Cup 304 trading days relative to all other 14,375 trading days during the study period. Table 2 summarizes the main regression results. The first part of the table reports the results for the EED and the second part reports the results for the EPED.
The most relevant column is the "World Cup days" column.
Insert Table 2
The following conclusions emerge from the results: 14 1. In all tests, the World Cup effect coefficient is negative, very large in absolute terms, and always highly significant (with t-values ranging from 32
2. The significance is robust to all tested variables and models. This includes the assumed length of the effect period (EED or EPED), the assumed model (with or without serial correlation, day of the week, the tax year, and the holiday variables), the assumed index (equally weighted or value weighted), and the elimination of the ten-most-extreme positive-and negative-return days, including the extreme negative-return day that falls during the World Cup of 1950.
3. The results are only slightly changed when a GARCH model is employed (see the last test on each part of the table).
4. The coefficient of the World Cup annual period of the year (June-July) is insignificant. Hence, the effect is not due to a seasonal June-July effect.
14 As the results corresponding to the control variables are very similar to those obtained in previous empirical studies, we only briefly report them in the tables.
To verify that no spurious correlation accounts for these results, we next examine additional factors with a potential effect on market prices. We first discuss some descriptive statistics regarding the World Cup period and then analyze it quantitatively.
The negative regression event coefficients may be spurious due to various factors. For example, one or two World Cup years that were bad years in the stock market may account for the results. There are several ways to check for the effect of such outlier bad years. We first compare each World Cup EED rate of return to the rate of return of the stock market for the whole period studied, and alternatively to the riskless interest rate. Figure 1 depicts the value of a $100 portfolio hypothetically invested in the NYSE Composite Index during the World Cup EED.
15
Insert Figure 1 This figure reveals that in 12 out of the 15 events, the rate of return during the EED is less than the riskless interest rate (at least -2% in seven events), and in 14 out of 15 years it is below the average rate of return on equity. Thus, in 14 out of 15 years of the World Cup we have a similar phenomenon: the rate of return on the EED is below the average rate of return in the stock market, indicating that, indeed, the relatively low negative rates of return on the World Cup EED reflect a pattern that is probably due to the event itself and not due to one or two outlier years. Despite the clear pattern shown in Figure 1 , it is possible that the rates of return for most of the 15 World Cup years were relatively low or even negative; hence, the found negative event regression coefficient is spurious. 15 Note that if no game is played in a specific day and in the previous day, the value is assumed to be unchanged.
Insert Table 3 Even a stronger result is revealed from 
The above analysis eliminates the possibility that in at least 14 World Cups, i.e., except of the Korean War in 1950, no other major event has potentially affected the returns during the World Cup periods. We turn now to quantitatively analyzing this issue and to empirically confirming that the results are robust to arbitrary elimination of any one or two World Cups, including that of 1950. As the results of all the tests given below corresponding to EED and EPED are very similar, for brevity sake we report only the results corresponding to EPED. Table 4 reports these robustness tests. The first part of Table 4 reports the results of the main model regression, given by eq. (1), where either one or two World Cup events are considered as non-EPED.
Insert Table 4
The outlier sensitivity results are straightforward. The effect is negative and significant even in the worst case, when we eliminate the World Cups of both 1950 and 1974, which are characterized by extremely low returns on the EPED. The effect coefficient is 11 − bp with a t-value of 21 . 2 − . Thus, neither two World Cup events, nor any unrelated event that occurred during the World Cup, accounts for the effect.
As previously explained, one may argue that by mere chance the non-World Cups years are better years, on average, than the years of the World Cups; hence, the association of the relative low returns on the World Cups days with the event is spurious. To unequivocally confirm that this is not the case, we run the regression only for the years of the World Cup. The second part of To sum up, no one or two outlier years, no significant world event, no possible bad World Cup years, and no June-July seasonality effect account for the negative rates of return recorded in the U.S. market during the World Cup. The association between the event itself and the rates of return is robust and not spurious.
V. Exploiting the World Cup Effect
As the effect is predictable, we next analyze how one can exploit the effect.
The meaning of the significant negative coefficient, 6 γ , is that whenever an event occurs, one could benefit, on average, from being out of the market during the World Cup period. 20 Note that in this section we employ EPED rather than EED, as it is more applicable for actual trading when taking into account transaction costs. 19 We also include the few days of May and August that are EPED.
20 This can also be seen from the raw data, as the average daily return on the NYSE Composite Index during the non-EPED is about 6.4 bp, whereas the average daily return during the EPED is 9 . 12 − bp.
A mean two-sample test reveals a t-value of either -3.46 or -3.79 when we eliminate the ten-mostpositive and ten-most-negative days from the sample.
One can employ a very simple investment strategy to exploit the event effect
and to obtain abnormal returns. The basic principle of the suggested investment strategy is to decrease the equity exposure during the EPED. $6,742, $6,543, $6,348, $6,161 and $5,978. profits is 1.53% per transaction (i.e., 3.06% per event). Of course, the above profits are hypothetical and are given for illustration purposes. The actual profits depend on the specific implementation, which could have been very difficult and expensive in the past when trading an index required trading each security separately.
Thus, as the effect in the U.S. market is predictable and does not depend on unknown information about the game results, it is also exploitable. Moreover, as our proposed strategy involves only shifting from equity to risk-free Treasury bills, it inherently decreases the portfolio risk. Specifically, while the daily standard deviation under the buy-and-hold strategy is equal to 0.00732, it is equal 0.00718 under the event effect strategic trading, with corresponding Sharpe ratios of 0.0546 and 0.0599.
As the proposed strategy both yields higher average returns and reduces risk, it dominates the buy-and-hold strategy by the well-known Markowitz (1952) meanvariance criterion.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In a recently published study, EGN (2007) find that international sporting events asymmetrically affect local stock prices, with a significant negative effect on the losing country's market and an insignificant positive effect on the winning country's market. However, one cannot exploit this information in local markets, as the game results are unknown in advance. In this study, we introduce a new dimension: we do not check for the effect on the markets of the two teams that play, but rather on the U.S. market. As the effect on the U.S. market, if exists, does not depend on the game result, it is exploitable. We develop a method to exploit this sentiment effect by looking, at the international level, for the aggregate effect of all local effects. As about one third of the transactions in the U.S. market are involved with non-U.S. investors, we expect the local sentiment to affect also the U.S. market.
We first document the effect of the World Cup on the U.S. market and then develop a strategy to exploit it.
The most important feature of our proposed approach is that, unlike the local effect, the aggregate effect does not depend on the game results, as it is always negative (due to the asymmetry found by EGN (2007)) and known in advance.
Namely, the aggregate effect in our case is an exploitable predictable effect. We find that the World Cup effect is large, highly significant, and long lasting. Finally, while the World Cup's effect on the U.S. market is probably unknown at the present time, it is possible that by recognizing and understanding this phenomenon, investors will find some financial devices to exploit it and, as a result, it may disappear. However, the most natural strategy in this case is to sell stocks short just before the World Cup starts, which will only intensify the stock price decline due to the World Cup event and may also induce the decline to start earlier, even before the games begin. Thus, like option irrational mispricing that does not disappear over time (see Constantinides, Jackwerth, and Perrakis (2008) ), this irrational market behavior also will probably be with us for a long period to come. The figure depicts the value of a $100 portfolio hypothetically invested in the NYSE Composite Index during the World Cup EED, which are defined as game days and the next trading days. If no game is played in a day and in the previous day then the value is assumed to be unchanged (in most events this includes one-day breaks before the final game and at about the middle of the World Cup period). The straight lines represent hypothetically investing the $100 at the riskless interest rate (lower line) and at the average rate of return on equity calculated for the entire period of 1950-2007 (upper line) . In 12 out of the 15 World Cups, the rate of return during the EED is less than the riskless interest rate, and in 14 it is below the average rate of return on equity. Note that the length of the World Cup period varies across the years. . The World Cup effect strategy assumes a buy-and-hold strategy during the non-Event Period Effect Days (EPED) and getting out of the market and investing the portfolio at the 3-month Treasury bill rate during the EPED, which are defined as the periods from the first game of each World Cup to the first day after the final game, plus two additional trading days that come immediately afterwards (marked by the dashed bars). The 3-month Treasury bill secondary market rate is taken from The Federal Reserve Board data series. Faruqee, Li, and Yan (2004) , based on the CPIS data of the IMF.
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Table 2: Main Regression Results
The table reports the results of the following regression: , where R t is the daily return, 0 γ is the regression intercept, R t-1 and R t-2 are the first and second previous day returns, respectively, H t is a dummy variable for days after a nonweekend holiday, D it , i = 1..4, are dummy variables for the day of the week, T t is a dummy variable for the first five days of the taxation year, P t is a dummy variable for the annual period of the games (June-July), E t stands for the games days, and J it , i = 1,2, are dummy variables for the 10 days with the highest (i = 1) and lowest (i = 2) returns during the studied period. The observed period includes 14,375 non-EPED and 304 EPED, from January 1950 to December 2007. The first line of each test reports the regression coefficients, and the second line reports the corresponding t-values (in brackets). * and ** indicate a significant level of 2% and 1%, respectively (a one-side test for the World Cup days). γ is the regression intercept, H t is a dummy variable for days after a non-weekend holiday, D it , i = 1..4, are dummy variables for the day of the week, T t is a dummy variable for the first five days of the taxation year, P t is a dummy variable for the annual period of the games (June-July), E t stands for the games days, and J it , i = 1,2, are dummy variables for the 10 days with the highest (i = 1) and lowest (i = 2) returns during the studied period. The observed period is composed of 14,375 non-EPED and 304 EPED, from January 1950 to December 2007. The regression period corresponding to the World Cup years only is composed of the 15 years of the World Cups (1950, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006) , with 3,513 non-EPED and 304 EPED. The regression period corresponding to June-July period only is composed of daily data of months June and July of each year, which includes 2,159 non-EPED and 304 EPED. The first line of each test reports the regression coefficients, and the second line reports the corresponding t-values (in brackets). * and ** indicate a significant level of 2% and 1%, respectively (a one-side test for the World Cup days). 
